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THE PROTECTION OF EQUITABLE INTERESTS
UNDER THE RECORDING ACT IN FLORIDA*
W.

SAM HOLLAND**

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to discuss the protection afforded
equitable interests in land by Florida's recording act.1 Because of
the many different types of equitable interests in real estate, this
article's scope is limited to the recording act's effect on one of the
most important types of equitable interests in land, the executory
land contract. Executory land contracts were chosen because: (1)
they are frequently used; (2) they may involve the expenditure of
large sums of money; and (3) there is some question in Florida
concerning their priority over other legal and equitable interests.
Other types of equitable interests also will be mentioned, for courts
have often spoken of equitable interests in general when interpreting
the protection to be given executory land contracts.
Creation of Equitable Interests by the
Executory Land Contract
If A enters into a contract to purchase land and B agrees in the
contract to sell the land, A and B have entered into an executory

land contract. A holds the equitable title to the land and B holds
the legal title. Both are bound to carry out the terms of the contract,
and a court of equity will specifically enforce the contract.
The vendee under an executory land contract is said to hold the
equitable title while the vendor continues to hold the legal title.
It is frequently said that the vendor holds this legal title in trust
for the vendee, while the vendee is said to hold the purchase money
in trust for the vendor. 2 According to Professor Pomeroy, the vendee
under an executory land contract acquires a real right, a right of
property in the land. 3 This right, although lacking legal title and
therefore equitable only, is nonetheless the real, beneficial ownership. This beneficial ownership is subject, however, to a lien of the
*This article received the 1966 "Chairman's Award" of the Lawyers' Title
Guaranty Fund as the best student work in the field of real property in the
State of Florida. It also received the first prize at the University of Florida.
**B.S.B.A. 1963, J.D. 1966, University of Florida; Member of The Florida Bar

and the Dade County Bar Association.
I.

2.
3.

FLA. STAT. §695.01 (1965).
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §308 (3d ed. 1939).
POMEROy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 105 (3d ed. 1905).
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vendor as security for the purchase price.' The vendee's interest
under an executory land contract descends as though it were real
property and the vendor's interest under the executory land contract
descends as personalty. The vendor still holds legal title under an
executory land contract, but only as trustee for the vendee. 5
It is obvious that the vendee under an executory land contract
obtains somewhat more than a mere equitable interest. It would be
more proper to call his interest that of an equitable estate or an
equitable title. However, neither the vendee's nor the vendor's rights
under an executory land contract are absolute. Before the vendee may
bring a suit for specific performance of the contract, he must tender
the purchase price to the vendor.6 Likewise, before the vendor may
bring an action at law to recover damages against the vendee, he
must show that he tendered the deed to the vendee. 7 Nevertheless,
the executory land contract creates an equitable title in the vendee
which results in the vendee being the beneficial owner of the property
for all intents and purposes.
Statutory Versus Common Law Protection of
EquitableInterests
In certain situations involving executory land contracts, the
Florida courts have fallen back on the common law principles of
priority when dealing with conflicting legal-equitable interests and
conflicting equitable-equitable interests. Unfortunately, the courts
have often ignored or refused to apply Florida's recording act, section
695.01 of the Florida Statutes, in these situations. The common-law
principles of priorities which were resorted to by the courts are here
briefly examined.
Pomeroy lists three fundamental and general rules concerning
priorities involving legal and equitable interests:8
(1) Among successive equitable estates or interests, where
there exists no special claim, advantage, or superiority in any
one over the others, the order of time controls.
(2) Between a conflicting legal and equitable title to the
subject-matter, the legal title prevails. But the legal title is
taken subject to the equitable title if purchased with knowledge of the prior equitable title.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ibid.
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §308 (3d ed. 1939).
Shouse v. Doane, 39 Fla. 95, 21 So. 807 (1897).
Miami Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Bell, 101 Fla. 1291, 133 So. 547 (1931).
2 -POmEROY, op. cit. supra note 3, §682.
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(3) The legal title being outstanding and not involved
in the controversy, where there are successive unequal equities
in the same subject-matter, as where there is a complete or
perfect equitable estate, precedence resulting from order of
time is defeated and the complete or perfect equity prevails.
At common law, if the owner in fee conveyed title to A and later
conveyed title to B, A prevailed over B. The rationale was that after
conveying to A, the owner had nothing left to convey to B. Therefore
A owned the legal title. To counter this result and to protect an
innocent purchaser who paid value and took without notice of a
prior conveyance, Florida adopted its recording statute, a part of
which reads as follows: 9
No conveyance, transfer or mortgage of real property, or
of any interest therein, nor any lease for a term of one year or
longer, shall be good and effectual in law or equity against
creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration
and without notice, unless the same be recorded according to
law....
In the preceding example this statute voids A's prior legal title as
against B's subsequent legal title. The theory is that A, by recording
his title, can protect himself against all subsequent purchasers. A's
recordation offers constructive notice to B, and B, if he has checked
the record, will see A's title and know that A is the owner. This
theory prevents a fraudulent owner from selling the legal title to two
or more purchasers.10
If section 695.01 modifies the subsequent purchase of an equitable
title to the same extent that it modifies the subsequent purchase
of a legal title, it would seem that a subsequent purchaser of an
equitable interest in real estate would prevail over prior, unrecorded
equitable interests. Similarly, the subsequent purchaser of an equitable interest should prevail over a prior, unrecorded legal interest.
The prior purchaser of either an equitable or legal interest, having
misled the subsequent equitable purchaser to buy through a failure
to record, should not defeat the subsequent, good-faith purchaser's
equitable title. Therefore, the subsequent purchaser's title, by a
normal reading of section 695.01, should prevail over the prior legal
or equitable interest. Unfortunately, section 695.01 has not been so
interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court.
Any attempt to speak in terms of protecting or not protecting
the subsequent equitable estate would be overly broad unless it is
9. FLA.
10.

STAT.

§695.01 (1965).

Rambo v. Dickenson, 92 Fla. 758, 110 So. 352 (1926).
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clearly shown how the equitable interest arose and who is challenging
it. Each category of transactions that gives rise to equitable interests
under an executory land contract is explained and discussed in the
following pages.
PRIOR RECORDED EQUITABLE INTEREST VERSUS SUBSEQUENT
LEGAL INTEREST

Category One. 0, the legal owner, enters into an executory land contract with A. A records. 0 then conveys legal
title to B.
PRIOR UNRECORDED EQUITABLE INTEREST VERSUS SUBSEQUENT
LEGAL INTEREST WITH NOTICE

Category Two. 0 enters into an executory land contract
with A. A fails to record. 0 then conveys legal title to B,
who purchases with knowledge of A's interest.
In Category One, 0, the legal owner entered into an executory land
contract with A. A recorded. 0 subsequently conveyed the legal title
to B. Because A recorded, B is charged with constructive notice of
A's equitable interest and hence A prevails.'" The same result would
occur in Category Two, that is, as prior equitable grantee would
defeat a subsequent purchaser who took with actual notice of the
prior, unrecorded equitable interest.12
In both Categories One and Two a prior equitable grantee under
an executory land contract defeats a subsequent legal grantee because
the legal grantee is charged with constructive notice in one instance
and has actual notice in the other. In neither of the situations, however, can it be said that section 695.01 is protecting the equitable
estate other than charging the subsequent purchaser with constructive
notice of the prior, recorded equitable interest as it did in Category
One. At common law a subsequent purchaser of a legal or equitable
estate who took with notice of a prior equitable interest was charged
with notice of that interest and took subject to it. A purchaser with
notice does not cut off prior or equitable interests.
Section 695.01 in Category One is doing nothing more than
charging a subsequent purchaser with constructive notice of the
prior equitable interest. It is not protecting a subsequent equitable
interest against a prior unrecorded legal or equitable interest in
Category One. The recording statute declares prior unrecorded inter11. Michaels v. Albert Pick & Co., 158 Fla. 877, 30 So. 2d 498 (1947).
12. Drake v. Brady, 57 Fla. 393, 48 So. 978 (1909); Tate v. Pensacola Gulf,
Land & Dev. Co., 37 Fla. 439, 20 So. 542 (1896).
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ests void as against a subsequent purchaser for value without notice.
In Category One and Category Two the courts are protecting a prior,
not a subsequent equitable interest. Cases with these conclusions,
therefore, should not be too broadly interpreted because a similar
result was reached at common law without a recording statute. The
only function the recording statute serves in Category One is that
of allowing the record to give constructive notice.
PRIOR VOIDABLE EQUITABLE INTEREST VERSUS SUBSEQUENT
EQUITABLE INTEREST

Category Three. 0 enters into an executory land contract
with a fraudulent vendee, A, the result of which gives A voidable equitable title. A assigns his interest to B. B then seeks
to enforce the contract against 0.
In Category Three, 0 through fraud is induced to enter into
an executory land contract with A. The result of this inducement is to
place a voidable equitable title in A, which A cannot enforce against
O because of the fraud. A then assigns the contract to B. The question
is: Can B enforce the contract against 0, even though A could not?
The answer, in all jurisdictions, is an emphatic "no." To point out
why B cannot enforce the contract, it is necessary to draw some
analogies to purchases of void and voidable legal titles.
If A had fraudulently obtained a void legal or equitable title
from 0 in Category Three, a subsequent bona fide purchaser from
A would get nothing. A void instrument passes no title.a1 However,
if the fraudulent grantee had acquired a voidable legal title and sold
such legal title to a subsequent bona fide purchaser, then the general
rule is that the subsequent bona fide purchaser is protected. A
subsequent bona fide purchaser of the voidable legal title generally
4
defeats prior interests.'
The situation presented in Category Three, however, is not that
of a subsequent bona fide purchaser of a voidable legal title. Rather,
B has purchased an equitable interest from an equitable grantor who
held only an equitable title. The situation here is a "solely" equitable
transaction because legal title is not in either A or B. No jurisdiction
can be found that protects B against the prior rights of 0, the legal
owner who was fraudulently induced to enter a voidable executory
land contract with A. The rationale behind not protecting B is that
13.

Robertson v. Robertson, 61 So. 2d 499

(Fla. 1952); Houston v. Forman,

92 Fla. 1, 109 So. 297 (1926); 8 THOMPSON, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§4303 (1963).
14. Hall v. Forman, 94 Fla. 682, 114 So. 560 (1927); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA R.A.
ESTATE TRANSAcTIONS §26.01 (1964).
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B purchased the executory contract knowing it would have to be
enforced against 0, not A. An executory land contract is not a
negotiable instrument. B is put on notice of any inequities that may
have occurred between A and 0 in the original procurement of the
contract. An equitable grantee is never put in a better position than
his "solely" equitable grantor.
A large number of decisions under Category Three are landgrant cases concerning the sale of public land in the early history
of the United States. For instance, in Taylor v. Weston, 15 one Weston
had filed an application for the grant of a homestead. Upon the
filing of such an application, Weston received a certificate of grant
that, after proof that Weston had lived on the land for a certain
period of time, allowed Weston to obtain legal title. Weston, without
homesteading the land, sold the equitable certificate to Payne. Payne
sought to enforce the certificate against the State of California
through a suit requiring the conveyance of the legal title even
though no one had homesteaded the land. The California Supreme
Court held that Payne was not a bona fide purchaser who cut off
the prior rights of the State of California. Payne purchased only
an equitable interest because that is all that Weston had in the
property. Payne was aware that the equitable interest would have
to be enforced against a third party, California, and therefore Payne
took subject to any equities which existed between Weston and the
State of California.
Other land-grant cases reached similar results.16 It is easy to
recognize the policy behind the land-grant decisions. Any other result
would have been disastrous to the states that were seeking homesteaders to live on the land. But the land-grant cases do not have
to be based on policy alone. There are sufficient legal and equitable
reasons for the land-grant decisions other than just policy.
A grantee who purchases an equitable interest from a grantor
who has only an equitable interest (a "solely" equitable grantor) is
aware that the equitable right will have to be enforced against a
third party. It is not unreasonable to require the grantee to check
with the third party. An equitable grantee from a "solely" equitable
grantor takes only what the grantor can convey. If the equitable
grantor could not enforce the equitable right against the legal owner,
then the equitable grantee should not be able to enforce that right.
All jurisdictions are in accord with this general principle of law."7
15. 77 Cal. 534, 20 Pac. 62 (1888).
16. E.g., Hawley v. Diller, 178 U.S. 476 (1900).

17. E.g., Boone v. Chiles, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 177 (1836); Myers v. Van Buskirk,
96 Fla. 704, 119 So. 123 (1928); Bruschke v. Wright, 166 I1. 183, 46 N.E. 813
(1897); Deskins v. Big Sandy Co., 121 Ky. 601, 89 S.W. 695 (1905); Johnson v.
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PRIOR VOIDABLE LEGAL INTEREST VERSUS SUBSEQUENT
EQUITABLE INTEREST

Category Four. 0 conveys legal title to a fraudulent grantee, A, the result of which gives A voidable legal title. A enters
into an executory contract for the sale of the property to B.
0 then seeks to rescind the sale before A conveys legal title
to B.
The situation presented in Category Four is similar to that of
Category Three, but under Category Four the equitable grantee is
dealing with a grantor who appears to own legal title. The question
is: Who prevails, 0 or B? In this situation B is not dealing with a
"solely" equitable grantor. The legal title appears to be in A, but
before B can secure a conveyance from A, 0 intervenes. The equitable grantee in this situation is in a better position than the equitable
grantee of a "solely" equitable grantor. Nevertheless, the great majority of jurisdictions, as will be more fully shown in Category Five, do
not protect the subsequent equitable grantee's title against the prior
legal owner.
In Villa v. Rodriguez, 8 the mortgagee Rodriguez purchased the
equity of redemption from the mortgagor under conditions that did
not conform to the standards required for such a sale. One Steele
then entered into an executory land contract with Rodriguez for
purchase of the land. Before Steele acquired the legal title, the mortgagor brought suit to cancel the sale of the equity of redemption.
Steele resisted this suit on the ground that he was a subsequent bona
fide purchaser who had relied on the record and who cut off prior,
unrecorded rights. The United States Supreme Court held that
Steele could not prevail because his rights lay only in an executory
land contract. Not having purchased the legal title before receiving
notice of the mortgagor's prior interests in the land, Steele was not
protected as he would have been had he acquired such legal title
before notice.
It is quite easy to sympathize with Steele in this situation, especially if he had paid Rodriguez a large consideration for the executory
land contract. Steele relied on the record and would have prevailed
had he purchased the legal title. It would seem that if Steele were
required to pay the remaining consideration under the executory

Hayward, 74 Neb. 157, 103 N.W. 1058 (1905); La Belle Coke Co. v. Smith, 221
Pa. 642, 70 At. 894 (1908); York v. McNutt, 16 Tex. 14, 67 Am. Dec. 607 (1856);
Shou Fe v. Griffith, 4 Wash. 161, 30 Pac. 93 (1892); Low Ther Oil Co. v. MillerSibley Oil. Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S.E. 433 (1903).
18. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 323 (1870).
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land contract to the mortgagor, then the intent of the recording
statutes would be more fully met. At any rate, Steele, a subsequent
good-faith purchaser, should at least be protected by the recording
statutes up to the amount he has paid for the equitable interest.1 9
Nevertheless, the courts of the United States have generally drawn
a distinction between a subsequent legal purchaser and a subsequent
equitable purchaser for the purposes of protecting title. The legal
purchaser's title has been protected. The equitable purchaser's title,

20
in most cases, has not.

PRIOR UNRECORDED LEGAL INTEREST VERSUS SUBSEQUENT
EQUITABLE INTEREST

Category Five. 0 conveys legal title to A who fails to
record. 0 then enters into an executory land contract with
B. Before B acquires the legal tide, A informs B of his prior
legal interest.
The plight of the equitable purchaser is more fully demonstrated
by this situation in Category Five, where the question is: Who prevails between A and B? The great weight of authority in the United
States is that the prior, unrecorded legal title prevails over the subsequent equitable title. Even though the legal purchaser failed to
record his prior interest and thereby caused a loss to the equitable
purchaser, the prior legal purchaser prevails. American Jurisprudence
2
states the rule thusly: '
The equitable interest of a purchaser under a contract of sale
is subject to the interest of a person claiming under the vendor
under a prior transaction, whether such transaction was effective to give a legal interest or an equitable interest merely.
This is in accord with the general rule that the protection
afforded a bona fide purchaser by a court of equity extends
only to persons purchasing and acquiring the legal title and
not to the purchaser of an equitable title.
American courts have interpreted the term "purchaser" in the
recording statutes to mean a purchaser of the legal title.22
19. As vill be pointed out later, Steele would probably get a lien on the
property if Rodriguez were unable to repay him.
20. Overall v. Taylor, 99 Ala. 12, 11 So. 738 (1892); 55 AM. Jun. Vendor and
Purchaser §658 (1946); see 8 THOMPSON, THE MODERN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY
§4312 (1963).
21. 55 Ams. JUR. Vendor and Purchaser§658 (1946).
22. Villa v. Rodriguez, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 323 (1870); Steele's Lessee v.
Spencer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 552 (1828).
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A vendee's title under an executory land contract from the legal
owner does not therefore prevail over a prior legal purchaser who
failed to record. One of the earliest, best known, and strongest authorities for this position was Mr. Chief Justice Marshall who stated in
Vattier v. Hinde:23

The rules respecting a purchaser without notice are framed
for the protection of him who purchases a legal estate, and
pays the purchase money without knowledge of an outstanding equity. They do not protect a person who acquires no
semblance of title. They apply fully only to the purchaser
of the legal estate. Even the purchaser of an equity is bound
to take notice of a prior equity.
The words of Mr. Justice Marshall have had a significant effect
on American law in this area. The early courts were concerned about
the subsequent equitable purchaser not having fully paid for his
interest. Since the full purchase price of the land is generally not
paid at the time the executory land contract is formed, early courts
had no trouble allowing the prior, unrecorded legal interest to prevail. This approach is not just, when applied to an equitable purchaser who may have paid a large sum of money on the executory
land contract. It is grossly unjust to a vendee who is living on the
land while making payments under an executory land contract.
Nevertheless, the majority rule is that a prior, unrecorded legal title
prevails over a subsequent equitable title, even though modern conditions and more contemporary courts are eating away at this rule
that was founded on common-law concepts of property ownership.
Florida appeared to follow the majority rule in Myers v. Van
Buskirk24 a 1928 Supreme Court case. The facts of Myers were as
follows:
Myers owned the land in fee simple. On April 15, 1925, Myers
entered into an executory land contract with Van Buskirk. This
contract was not recorded until November 19, 1925. On July 1,
1925, Myers entered into another executory land contract with
Belk and Cunningham (Belk). This contract was immediately
recorded.
On October 31, 1925, Belk quitclaimed his interest in the contract to Cobb and Cambron (Cobb). Cobb purchased Belk's
interest without any knowledge of Van Buskirk's prior equity.
Cobb also took a warranty deed from Myers on October 31, 1925,
thereby joining the legal and equitable titles. However, the
23.

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 252, 271 (1833).

24. 96 Fla. 704, 119 So. 123 (1928).
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warranty deed from Myers was paid for by check that was to be
held in escrow until Myers cleared title in another suit in which
he was involved. Before the check was cashed, Van Buskirk, on
November 23, 1925, notified Cobb of his prior equitable interest.
Van Buskirk later brought suit to enforce the executory land
contract against Cobb, claiming that Cobb did not pay full consideration for the warranty deed from Myers before receiving
actual notice of his prior equity.
The court dealt with the case by breaking it down into three questions: (1) Was Cobb a bona fide purchaser under the warranty deed
from Myers? (2) Was Cobb a bona fide purchaser under the quitclaim deed from Belk? (3) If Cobb was not a bona fide purchaser
under either the quitclaim deed or the warranty deed but rather was
a holder of conflicting equities with Van Buskirk, which equity prevails?
The court held that Cobb was not a bona fide purchaser under
the warranty deed from Myers because he received actual notice of
Van Buskirk's prior equity before having paid any of the considerations for the warranty deed or becoming irrevocably bound for such
payments. Even though Myers had conveyed legal title to Cobb, he
was not a purchaser for value because he had not paid the full consideration to Myers, the check being uncashed and in escrow. Not
having paid for the warranty deed, Cobb could not claim to be a
purchaser for value under the Florida recording statute.
The second question posed by the court, whether Cobb was a
bona fide purchaser under the quitclaim deed from Belk, is the heart
of the Myers case for the purposes of this article. The court said that
Cobb was not a bona fide purchaser under the quitclaim deed because the rules respecting bona fide purchasers are framed for the
protection of one who purchases a legal estate and pays value without
notice of an outstanding equity. Because Cobb acquired only an
equitable estate under the quitclaim deed from Belk, the court said
Cobb was not a bona fide purchaser.
The effect of the quitclaim deed, said the court, was to put Cobb
in the exact position occupied by Belk. The position of Belk was
that of a subsequent purchaser of an equitable title for value, and
without notice, from the owner of the legal estate. From the court's
holding that Cobb did not prevail under the quitclaim deed, the
conclusion is easily drawn that Belk would not have prevailed over
Van Buskirk because the court specifically said that Cobb now occupied the same position that Belk once held.
If a subsequent equitable interest cannot prevail over a prior
equitable interest, then certainly it cannot prevail over a prior legal
interest. Myers has been cited for the proposition that a subsequent

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss4/2
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equitable grantee in Florida does not defeat prior, unrecorded legal
5

or equitable interests.2

It is interesting to examine the position taken by the court in
the Myers case by tracing the authority the court relied upon to justify
2
its position. At one point the court stated: .

In order to claim the full protection of the rule as to bona fide
purchasers, the purchaser must hold a legal title, or be entitled to call for it, for if his title be merely equitable, then it
must yield to a superior equity in an adverse party. It has
been frequently held that a purchaser claiming solely through
an executory contract of purchase and sale is not a bona fide
purchaser within the meaning of the rule.
The Florida court cited several authorities for this rule of law, including Taylor v. Weston 2 7 a California land-grant case in which the
equitable grantee wanted more rights than his "solely" equitable
grantor. The Pennsylvania case of LaBelle Coke Co. v. Smith2s also
concerned an equitable grantee and his "solely" equitable grantor.
York's Administrator v. McNutt,2 9 was the third

case cited

in

Myers. A, a "solely" equitable grantor, procured an executory land
grant from the legal owner. The consideration was a gambling debt.
A assigned to B. The Texas court held that because A could not
enforce the executory land contract, neither could B.
It is obvious that the court was taking the rule concerning a
"solely" equitable grantor and applying it to the fact situation of
Myers. The Florida court recognized that it was applying the "solely"
equitable grantor rule because it noted: "The fact that the legal title
is not in his assignor is notice that he is buying an inchoate title
30
imperfect on its face."
In effect, the court in Myers put Cobb in the position of a grantee
from a "solely" equitable grantor. This result was accomplished by
pointing to the fact that Cobb purchased from Belk, who held only
equitable title. However, this approach completely ignores the fact that
the court explicitly stated that the result of the quitclaim deed from
Belk was to put Cobb in the identical position occupied by Belk.
Belk purchased his equitable title from the legal owner, Myers, and
not from a "solely" equitable grantor. The court apparently overlooked the fact that the important question was not whether Cobb
25. 55 A?. JuR. Vendor and Purchaser §§674, 678 (1946);
REAL EsrATE TRANSACTONS §28.04 (1964).

1 BoYa,

FLORIDA

26. Myers v. Van Buskirk, 96 Fla. 704, 712, 119 So. 123, 126 (1928).
27. 77 Cal. 534, 20 Pac. 62 (1888).
28. 221 Pa. 642, 70 At. 894 (1908).
29.

16 Tex. 14, 67 Am. Dec. 607 (1856).

30. Myers v. Van Buskirk, 96 Fla. 704, 119 So. 123, 126 (1928).
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was a bona fide purchaser under the quitclaim deed from Belk, but
whether Belk would have prevailed over Van Buskirk. At no point
in the case is there a discussion concerning the priority of the con31
flicting equitable interests of Belk and Van Buskirk. The court said:
The grantee in a quitclaim deed without words of conveyance
and without covenants, a mere deed of release, occupies the
same postion as did his grantorand takes subject to any defenses available against his grantor. Such a grantee is not a bona
fide purchaser within the meaning of the recording statutes.
Cobb was a grantee under a quitclaim deed and did occupy the same
position of his grantor, Belk. Yet the court never discussed the relative position of Belk. If Belk had prevailed over Van Buskirk, then
Cobb, on the basis of the court's own words, should have prevailed
over Van Buskirk. Perhaps the court was not concerned with the
question whether Belk would prevail over Van Buskirk because of
the way the court intended to answer the third point in the case.
The third question posed by the court was: Between the equities
of Cobb and Van Buskirk, who should prevail? The court found
that Cobb should prevail, not because he was a bona fide purchaser
of a legal or equitable interest, but because he had joined the legal
and the equitable title so as to cut off the prior equity. The commonlaw rule of priority is that between two equal conflicting equities,
if one of the equities is joined with the legal title, then joinder of
the two titles will defeat prior or subsequent equities. The court had
to struggle somewhat here in view of the fact that it had earlier held
Cobb not to be a bona fide purchaser under the warranty deed from
Myers. The court held that for the purpose of joinder of legal and
equitable titles so as to defeat prior equitable titles, the standards
concerning the purchase of the legal title do not have to conform
to the normal standards of a bona fide purchase of the legal title.
In other words, the important factor was that Cobb had acquired
legal title, even though the had not paid for it, when he received
notice of Van Buskirk's prior equity.
By a careful reading of Myers, it is possible to restrict the case to
the situation of an equitable grantee (Cobb) purchasing a "solely"
equitable grantor's interest (Belk). All authorities cited by the court,
with one exception, 32 dealt with the "solely" equitable grantor problem, which is answered identically by all jurisdictions. The court
overlooked or ignored the question of priority between Belk and Van
Buskirk. It would not be unreasonable to say, therefore, that the
Myers case provides no answer to the problem of a conflict between
31. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
32. Starr Piano Co. v. Baker, 8 Ala. App. 499, 62 So. 549 (1913).
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prior and subsequent equitable grantees, both of whom purchased
from the legal owner. As indicated earlier, no court has so restricted
Myers. Rather, it is generally cited for the proposition that a purchaser of an equity, whether from the legal owner or a "solely" equi3
table grantor, does not cut off prior legal or equitable interests.
Unless Myers is restricted to the situation of a "solely" equitable
grantor, there appears to be a direct conflict in the Florida law in
this area in view of the Second District Court of Appeal case of
Buck v. McNab, Jr.3 4 Certiorari was denied in the Buck case by the
Florida Supreme Court.8 5 In Buck, one McNab conveyed legal title
in fee simple to each of his two grandsons. These deeds were not
recorded. Buck later entered into an executory land contract with
McNab, paying a consideration of 750 dollars. McNab died without
having completed the contract with Buck. Buck subsequently sought
to enforce the contract against the executor of the estate, McNab, Jr.
The executor, after learning of the prior deed to the two grandsons,
tendered back the 750 dollars. Buck brought suit seeking specific performance of the contract. The chancellor found the equities to be
with the grandchildren and refused specific performance. On appeal,
the court allowed Buck to enforce the contract against the estate.
The court held Buck to be a subsequent purchaser for value and
without notice and therefore protected under section 695.01 against
prior unrecorded interests in the land.
The Buck case allowed a subsequent equitable purchaser who
purchased from the legal owner to prevail over a prior legal grantee
who had failed to record. In essence, Buck was allowed to enforce the
contract against the two grandchildren specifically. It must be pointed out that Buck dealt with what appeared to be the legal owner.
Buck did not deal with a "solely" equitable grantor. Therefore, if
Myers can be limited to the situation of a "solely" equitable grantor,
then Buck is not contrary to Myers, but rather it is the first Florida
case to deal with this peculiar fact situation. However, as indicated
earlier, the Myers case has not been so limited. Even if Myers is so
limited, the Buck decision is still against the weight of authority in
other jurisdictions.
Professor Boyer has criticized the court in Buck for extending the
protection of section 695.01 without an adequate explanation of its
reasons and authority for the holding3 Professor Boyer has this to
3
say concerning the decision: 7
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

55 Am. JUR. Vendor and Purchaser§§674, 678 (1946).
139 So. 2d 734 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
Buck v. McNab, Jr. 146 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1962).
Boyer & Ross, Real Property Law, 18 U. MIAMi L. REV. 799, 810 (1964).
Ibid.
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The Second District Court of Appeal, apparently unaware
that it was doing so, extended the protection of the recording
act to the holder of an equitable interest, namely a vendee
under a contract to purchase. Previously, the Florida cases
had restricted such protection to innocent purchasers of legal
interests.
Professor Boyer cites Myers and Bauman v. Peacock 38 as the previous
Florida authority restricting the protection of the recording act to
subsequent purchasers of a legal interest. He continues: 39
This conclusion does not seem to be justified. Traditionally,
the recording act has been so utilized to resolve disputes between competing legal interests. In the ordinary commercial
transaction, the purchaser normally does not rely on the recording act at the time he enters into the contract; rather it
is after the contract is signed that the purchaser examines the
title and then decides whether or not to complete the purchase. If before the closing the vendee learns of unrecorded
deeds, inconsistent possession or other circumstances, he usually cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser without notice.
Further, even where the purchaser has acquired the legal title,
if he receives notice of a defect in the title before paying the
entire consideration, he is only entitled to pro tanto protection. In the instant case, by obtaining specific performance,
the vendee acquired as full protection of the recording act as
if he had paid the full price and received a deed before obtaining notice.
Professor Boyer's conclusion that Buck has extended Florida's recording statute is well founded if Myers and Bauman stand for the
rules for which he cites them. However, if Myers can be limited to
the situation of a "solely" equitable grantee, then Buck is not a violation of the Myers doctrine but rather an initial question under Florida law. Bauman, as will be shown below, definitely is restricted to
the "solely" equitable grantor situation.
Professor Boyer's point that a subsequent purchaser of a legal
interest will receive only pro tanto protection if the full purchase
price is not paid is well taken. If Florida will protect a subsequent
legal purchaser who receives notice before paying full value, only
up to the amount he has paid, then surely Buck, a mere subsequent
equitable purchaser, should not have received specific performance.

38.
39.

80 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1955).
Boyer & Ross, supra note 46, at 811.
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However, the pro tanto rule has three different methods of application:40
(1) Some courts allow the innocent purchaser to retain, of
the land purchased, the proportion for which he has paid.
(2) Some give the innocent purchaser a lien upon the land
for the amount of the purchase money paid.
(3) Other courts give to the innocent purchaser all the
land, with a right in the real owner to recover from him the
purchase money unpaid at the time of notice.
In each of the above three instances, the subsequent purchaser of the
legal title receives protection-at least up to the amount of money
he has paid toward title before receiving notice of the prior claim.
There is no direct Florida Supreme Court holding establishing
which application of the pro tanto rule Florida will follow. 4 1 The

1965 Florida court of appeal case of Wise v. Quina42 is relevant to
this area, but the court found that the subsequent purchaser of the
legal title had become irrevocably bound to pay the remaining purchase price. Such a finding, in essence, meant that the subsequent
purchaser had paid the full consideration. Therefore, application of
the pro tanto rule was never reached because the pro tanto rule is
employed only where there has been a partial payment.
Nevertheless, the Wise court quoted the following language from
4
Myers concerning application of the pro tanto rule: 3
If, however, a purchaser has notice, actual or constructive, of
prior adverse rights in the land, before he has paid the purchase price or has become irrevocably bound for its payment,
he is not protected as a bona fide purchaser, even though he
may have received a deed purporting to convey to him the
whole title, both legal and equitable.
If indeed this is the approach the Florida Supreme Court will take
when directly confronted with such a situation, then it appears that
Florida will apply the pro tanto rule to protect only a subsequent
legal grantee's purchase money rather than his title. The Wise court
assumed that this was the Florida approach.
Professor Boyer does not appear to have made such an assumption. In his two-volume work on Florida real estate transactions, he
explicitly points out that the rights of a subsequent legal grantee
who has paid only a nominal consideration have not been decided
40.

8 THOMPSON, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §4322, at 418 (1963).

41.

1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSAcTIONS §28.04 (1964).
174 So. 2d 590 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
Wise v. Quina, 174 So. 2d 590, 593 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).

42.
43.
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in Florida.4 4 And, as earlier pointed out, the pro tanto rule has three
different applications. Florida conceivably could choose to follow any
one of the three.
Professor Thompson points out that the majority of those courts
that apply the pro tanto rule protect the subsequent legal purchaser
only up to the amount of his partial payment. 45 But Professor
Thompson does not appear to answer the question of protecting a
subsequent equitable grantee up to the amount he has paid on his
contract. It has already been noted that most American courts do
not consider a subsequent equitable grantee a bona fide purchaser
for purposes of protection under the recording acts. Will these courts
protect a subsequent equitable grantee up to the amount he has paid
on his contract?
In Ballona v. Petex,48 a Michigan case, the plaintiff had given a
deed to Petex. Lezin and Bockall then purchased under an executory
land contract from Petex and had paid 630 dollars on the contract
before receiving notice that plaintiff was suing in equity to have the
deed declared a mortgage. Plaintiff was successful in his suit but
nevertheless was required to pay Lezin and Bockall the 630 dollars
that they had paid on the contract. They were bona fide purchasers as
to that amount. Plaintiff, in seeking equity, had to do equity, and
the subsequent equitable purchaser was therefore protected as to his
purchase money on the contract.
In Sequin v. Maloney,47 one Cameron sold the legal title to A who
failed to record. Cameron died. Later, Mrs. Cameron entered into
an executory land contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff sought specific
performance of the contract after learning of A's prior rights, claiming to be a bona fide purchaser. The Oregon court refused to give
plaintiff specific performance of the contract, holding that the rules
respecting a bona fide purchaser are framed for the protection of a
purchaser of legal title. However, the court granted plaintiff a lien
on the property in the amount of the consideration plaintiff had paid
on the executory land contract.
In Henry v. Philips,48 a California court indicated that a subsequent equitable grantee would be protected up to the amount he
had paid on his contract of purchase. More specifically, the court
9
stated:4

44. 1 BOYER, op. cit. supra note 41, §28.04.
45.

THOrPSON, op. cit. supra note 40, §4322.

46.
47.
48.
49.

234 Mich. 273, 207 N.W. 836 (1926).
198 Ore. 272, 253 P.2d 252 (1953).
163 Cal. 135, 124 Pac. 837 (1912).
Henry v. Phillips, 163 Cal. 135, 145, 124 Pac. 837, 841 (1912).
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The evidence is conflicting in this; that one party says the
sale was evidenced by a deed, while the other understood or
at least says he understood, that it was evidenced by an executory agreement. In either case it would be necessary, as a condition to granting Henry any relief, to make adequate provision securing the return to Philips of the money paid to
Henry.
Courts that employ the pro tanto rule when dealing with subsequent legal grantees invariably protect at least the purchase money
of the legal grantee. 50 The prior grantee (as well as his grantor) bears
the burden of this protection because his negligence in not recording
caused the subsequent grantee's loss. This same sort of protection
was extended to subsequent equitable grantees in the Ballona and
Sequin cases. The court in Henry also indicated that it would follow
this line of reasoning.
There is a scarcity of cases concerning the protection of subsequent equitable grantees. However, on the basis of the Ballona,
Sequin, and Henry cases, it should be safe to assume that most courts
would protect the subsequent equitable grantee up to the amount he
had paid on his contract. The broad general rule followed by most
jurisdictions-that subsequent equitable grantees are not bona fide
purchasers for purposes of the recording acts-loses its validity when
faced with an innocent equitable grantee who has relied on the
record. For purposes of protecting his purchase money, the subsequent equitable grantee is a bona fide purchaser. Furthermore, as
the court pointed out in Henry, if a subsequent legal grantee has
made substantial improvements on the property before learning of
the prior legal claim, most courts protect the subsequent legal grantee
to the full extent of the property. The money remaining to be paid
by the subsequent legal grantee to the grantor would instead be paid
to the prior legal grantee. Such a result is eminently fair and would
also be fair where a subsequent equitable grantee had made substantial improvements on the property. Buck went even further than
this by protecting a subsequent equitable grantee's title instead of
his purchase money even though he had made no improvements on
the land.
If the Florida courts intend to follow the pro tanto rule of protecting a subsequent legal grantee only to the amount he has paid
toward his legal title, the court in Buck arrived at an erroneous conclusion. It is hoped that Florida will not follow the pro tanto approach. A subsequent legal grantee who learns of a prior, unrecorded
legal title after having paid only one-third or one-half of the pur50.

8 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 40, §4322.
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chase price normally would not be satified with the mere return of
his money. After all, he wants the land, not his money. The intent
of the parties and the recording statute would be more fully met
by requiring the subsequent legal grantee to pay the remainder of
the purchase price to the prior legal grantee who failed to record
his interest. This requirement could be accomplished without any
harm to the existing Florida rule that heirs, devisees, ana donees are
not bona fide purchasers within the meaning of the recording act. 5
In this way, the subsequent legal grantee who has paid a valuable
consideration could retain the land but start making payments to
the prior legal grantee who failed to record.
The same treatment could be given the subsequent equitable
grantee who has paid a valuable consideration. There is no sound
reason for denying full protection of the recording statute to either
a subsequent legal or equitable grantee who has paid a valuable
consideration. Because of the lack of direct Florida Supreme Court
authority, there is nothing unsound about the Buck decision, although it admittedly is against the great weight of authority. Certainly section 695.01 offers nothing to indicate that Buck should have
been decided differently. Perhaps Buck will offer a new solution
to an old problem.
PRIOR UNRECORDED EQUITABLE INTEREST VERSUS SUBSEQUENT
EQUITABLE INTEREST WITHOUT NOTICE

Categoy Six. 0 enters into an executory land contract
with A who fails to record. 0 enters into an executory land
contract with B who purchases without notice of the prior
equity. A seeks to enforce his contract.
The sixth category presented for analysis concerns two conflicting
equities rather than conflicting legal and equitable interests. At the
outset it should be noted that both grantees here are dealing with
the legal owner. Therefore none of the rules based on the equitable
grantee from a "solely" equitable grantor should be used to cloud
the picture.
Before Buck it was generally held in Florida, on the basis of
Myers, that A would prevail. If Buck is the Florida approach, then
certainly B would prevail. Buck allowed a subsequent equitable
interest to defeat a prior legal interest, so surely it would allow a
subsequent equitable interest to defeat a prior equitable interest.
There is a definite split of authority in other jurisdictions. In
Paul v. McPherrin,52 the Colorado court stated what it regarded as
51.

1 BoYER, op. cit. supra note 41, §28.04.
Pac. 59 (1910).

52. 48 Colo. 522, 111
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the general rule in the United States: A purchaser who has not obtained the legal title before notice of the prior equity, even though
by contract and payment without notice he has acquired an equitable
title, cannot after notice of the prior equity acquire legal title in
order to defeat the prior equity. In Overall v. Taylor,53 the Alabama
court said that in order to cut off prior legal or equitable estates
of which there is no notice, legal title must be acquired. In American
54
Jurisprudenceit is stated:
The interest of a purchaser of real estate before a conveyance
is a mere equitable interest, and is not sufficient to afford the
purchaser protection against an earlier equal equity. Similarly, as between successive assignees of the purchaser's interest
the first in time has priority, the equities being otherwise
equal.
Such broad statements overlook the purpose behind the recording
laws. A prior equitable interest that was not recorded should not
be equal to a subsequent equitable interest taken without knowledge
of the prior equity. There is no policy consideration in this instance
of protecting a legal interest against an equitable interest. The conflicting interests in this situation are strictly equitable, and courts
that fail to protect the subsequent equity here are not utilizing the
recording statutes as they probably were intended. A subsequent
equitable purchaser should definitely defeat a prior, unrecorded
equity. By failing to protect the subsequent grantee, these courts
limit the application and effectiveness of the recording statutes.
Pomeroy recognized that modern recording statutes contemplated
conflicting equitable interests. He stated: 55
[T]he tendency of modern legislation has been to enlarge
their [the recording statutes'] scope and to define their operation, so that they should . . . include every kind of instrument
by which the ownership and enjoyment of land may be affected. . . . The intention is, to compel every person receiving
such an instrument to place it upon the records, in order that
he may thereby protect his own rights as well as those of all
others who may afterwards acquire an interest in the same
property. . . . [A] person about to deal with respect to any
parcel of land should be able to discover . . . every existing
and outstanding estate, title, or interest in it which could affect
the rights of a bona fide purchaser.
53. 99 Ala. 12, 11 So. 738 (1892).
54. 55 AM. JUR. Vendor and Purchaser§682 (1946).
55. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §649, at 1110 (3d ed. 1905).
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The old rules concerning common-law priorities should not govern
the application of the recording statutes. Between conflicting equal
equities at common law, the rule was that prior in time was prior
in right. The recording statutes make the equities unequal by allowing them to be recorded. A prior unrecorded equity should not be
equal to a subsequent equity purchased in good faith, just as a prior,
unrecorded legal interest is not equal to a subsequent legal interest
purchased in good faith. A blind application of the common-law
rules of priority, without modification by the recording statutes, results in unjustness and unfairness to the subsequent equitable grantee.
Pomeroy detected these modifications wrought by the recording
statutes, as indicated by remarks in his work on equity jurisprudence:56
It should be remembered, however, in applying the doctrine,
that it has been materially modified by the recording statutes.
Whenever, as is commonly the case in this country, the defense of a bona fide purchase arises in connection with recording, the true rule would seem to be as follows: The defendant
[bona fide purchaser] must aver in his plea or answer that he
has purchased an estate which comes within the protection
of the recording acts; or in other words, that he has purchased
an estate or interest, legal or equitable, of such a kind that the
conveyance or instrument constituting his muniment of title
must or may be recorded, so that by his recording it he can
obtain the protection which the statutes give to such a bona
fide purchaser who has first put his instrument of title on
record.
57
Pomeroy gives the following example:

If where these enactments [recording acts] exist, the owner of
land gives a contract for its sale to A, and afterwards, gives
a like contract to B, both vendees being equally meritorious,
and A's contract is not recorded, while B, without notice, puts
his agreement upon record, B undoubtedly obtains a precedence by his record....
It is only fair that B prevail over A, in Pomeroy's example, because
B dealt with the legal owner for value and without notice. B dealt
with the legal owner as opposed to an equitable owner and the conflicting interests were both purely equitable. B therefore should prevail in this situation and in the similar situation posed in the seventh
category discussed below.
56.
57.

Id. §785, at 1393-94.
Id. §772, at 1378.
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PRIOR UNRECORDED EQUITABLE

INTEREST VERSUS SUBSEQUENT EQUITABLE INTEREST WITHOUT NOTICE

Category Seven. Legal owner 0 enters into an executory
land contract with A. The contract is recorded. A then assigns his interest in the contract to B, who fails to record.
A then assigns his interest in the contract to C. Between B
and C, who prevails?

There is what may be considered direct authority that B prevails
in Florida. Myers v. Van Buskirk"s could properly be cited for the
position that B prevails. Even stronger authority for such a proposi-

tion is the 1955 Florida Supreme Court case of Bauman v. Peacock.59
The facts of Bauman were as follows:
Holmes contracted to buy certain property from Stone.
Holmes recorded. Holmes then assigned his contract to Peacock (B), who failed to record. Another party, Bauman (C),
later obtained a judgment against Holmes and subsequently
got an equitable decree declaring said judgment to be an
equitable lien. A contest developed between B, the assignee,
and C, the holder of the lien.
The court held that C had actual notice of B's prior equity because
at the time C recorded his judgment, the land was occupied by B's
tenants. But the court went on to give another reason why B pre60
vailed over C:

The appellee [Peacock] and his assignor, Holmes, each at most
had only an equitable interest in the property. Appellant in
seeking to establish a lien on this interest is at most in the
position of a purchaser of an interest solely equitable in nature. Thus, only equitable interests being involved in this
case, the rule protecting a bona fide purchaser has no application because the protection of that rule extends only to those
purchasing a legal title. An equitable interest ordinarily is

taken with all its imperfections and outstanding equities; and
other things being equal, between persons having equitable
interests only, the equity prior in point of time prevails.
It is important to note that both of the equitable grantees in Bauman
were claiming against a person who had only an equitable interest

58.
59.

96 Fla. 704, 119 So. 123 (1928).
80 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1955).

60. Id. at 366. (Emphasis added.)
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in the land. Bauman is, therefore, distinguishable from Buck v. McNab.6,
Other courts that have considered the Bauman situation have not
reached the result of the Florida court. In Mills v. Rossiter,62 one
Morton entered into an executory contract for the sale of land.
Morton then assigned his interests in the contract to one Whitney
who failed to record. Morton then assigned his interests in the contract to the plaintiff. The California Supreme Court held that plaintiff prevailed. Whitney had failed to record his contract and therefore
was cut off by a subsequent purchaser for value and without notice.
The court held that when one of two innocent parties must suffer
by the acts of a third party, the party that has caused the suffering
must bear the loss.
In General Insurance Co. v. United States Insurance Co.,63 the
Maryland court protected a subsequent equitable mortgagee against
a prior equitable mortgagee who had failed to record. Similarly, in
Bellas v. McCarty,64 the court, in considering conflicting claims of two
equitable grantees from the same equitable grantor, felt that the recording act in Pennsylvania drew no distinction between legal and
equitable interests. The Pennsylvania court stated:65
We are further of opinion, that a bona fide purchaser of an
estate, whether legal or equitable, without notice, either actual
or constructive, who has in due time recorded his deed, and in
other respects pursued his claim with diligence, is to be preferred to a previous purchaser claiming under a sheriff's deed,
the acknowledgment of which has never been registered.
However, in McGregor v. Putney6- the New Hampshire court did not
protect a subsequent equitable grantee against a prior equitable grantee who had failed to record.
In each of the four previously cited cases the situation concerned
conflicting equitable grantees from a "solely" equitable grantor. In
three of these cases, the courts protected the subsequent equitable
grantee against the prior equitable grantee. If these courts protected
a subsequent equitable grantee who purchased from a "solely" equitable grantor, then certainly they would protect a subsequent equitable grantee who purchased from the legal owner, against the claim
of a prior equitable grantee who failed to record his interests.
61.

139 So. 2d 784 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962), cert. denied, 146 So. 2d 374 (Fla.

1962).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

156 Cal. 167, 103 Pac. 896 (1909).
10 Md. 517, 69 Am. Dec. 174 (1857).
10 Watts 13 (Pa. 1840).
Id. at 31. (Emphasis added.)
75 N.H. 113, 71 At. 226 (1908).
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Pomeroy takes the view that a subsequent equitable grantee would
be protected in this situation and cites the following example:67
In like manner, if A, the legal owner of land, gives a contract
of sale to B, and this vendee executes a deed purporting to
convey the land to C, and afterwards executes a like deed to D,
both grantees being equally meritorious, and C's deed is unrecorded, but D, without notice, puts his upon record, then D,
although acquiring only an equitable interest by his conveyance, would undoubtedly gain the precedence over C.
Pomeroy is eminently correct. D should prevail over C because C
failed to record, and this failure to record resulted in D's being unaware of any prior equity.
The better reasoned cases, along with Pomeroy, hold that in the
situations presented in Categories Six and Seven, the subsequent
equitable grantee prevails. It is quite easy to reach this result under
the Florida recording statute. Unfortunately, the Bauman6s decision
appears to say that the prior equitable grantee prevails in Category
Seven, even though he failed to record and hence caused the loss.
Bauman cites Myers69 as authority for its position. As earlier indicated, Myers may properly be limited to the situation of a "solely"
equitable grantor. Bauman is definitely limited to the "solely" equitable grantor situation because both Peacock and Bauman were claiming under a "solely" equitable grantor.
Moreover, it is submitted that both the Myers and the Bauman
decisions misinterpret the "solely" equitable grantor doctrine. That
doctrine originated in order to protect the legal owner from a subsequent equitable grantee who claimed more rights than could his
equitable grantor. Surely that doctrine was not meant to be extended
to defeat the equitable title of a subsequent grantee who purchased
in good faith and relied on the record. It is true that the majority
of courts do not protect a subsequent equitable grantee's title against
a prior legal grantee who failed to record. But as earlier noted, between conflicting equitable grantees, whether claiming under an equitable grantor or the legal owner, the better reasoned cases protect the
subsequent equitable grantee's title against a prior equitable grantee
who failed to record. The "solely" equitable grantor doctrine should
be limited to protecting the defrauded legal owner. Certainly it
should not be extended to defeat the intent of the recording acts.
Bauman and M~yers, besides thwarting the purpose behind the
recording statute, also ignore the treatment given an executory land
67.
68.
69.

PoM.Roy, op. cit. supra note 55, at 1378-79.
Bauman v. Peacock, 80 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1955).
Myers v. Van Buskirk, 96 Fla. 704, 119 So. 123 (1928).
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contract by the Florida Supreme Court in other situations. With
this in mind, it would be proper at this point to show how the
supreme court has treated executory land contracts and why they
are due more respect than that given them in the Bauman and Myers
decisions.
As indicated earlier, a valid contract for the sale of land is
specifically enforceable in equity by the vendee. Once the contract
has been entered, the legal owner holds the legal tide in trust for
the vendee. The vendee immediately acquires an equitable tide and
is said to hold the purchase price in trust for the vendor. Title, for
all intents and purposes, leaves the vendor when he enters an executory contract for the sale of his property.
A vendee of an executory contract is protected against subsequent
purchasers of the legal title if the contract is recorded 70 or if the
subsequent legal title is purchased with actual knowledge of the
unrecorded executory contract.71 Once the contract is entered, any
damages to the property fall on the vendee. For example, the vendee
cannot escape the contract because of a hard freeze that damages the
property.72 Such damages fall on the vendee whether he is in posses73
sion or not.
In Latin American Bank v. Rogers,74 the vendee was in possession
under an executory contract. An execution sale was taken against the
bare legal title that the vendor still had in the land. The vendee
bought the legal title at the execution sale for an amount that was
less than the value of the legal title. (The value of the legal title
was the amount of money the vendee still owed under the contract.)
The supreme court said that in Florida the vendee may not purchase
at an execution sale so as to defeat the vendor's rights under the
executory contract. The vendee may credit what he pays at the
execution sale toward the purchase price under the executory contract, but he cannot extinguish the executory contract unless he pays
full value. The vendee is held to a high standard.
5
the court held that a vendor
In South Florida Farms Co. v. Hall,7
may not maintain an action of ejectment against a vendee, in possession under an executory contract, who is not in default. And even
if the vendee is in default, if the contract does not make time of the

70. Michaels v. Albert Pick & Co., 158 Fla. 877, S0 So. 2d 498 (1947).
71. Marion Mortgage Co. v. Grennan, 106 Fla. 913, 143 So. 761 (1932); Drake
v. Brady, 57 Fla. 393, 48 So. 978 (1909).
72. Felt v. Morse, 80 Fla. 154, 85 So. 656 (1920).
73. Insurance Co. of No. America v. Erickson, 50 Fla. 419, 39 So. 495 (1905).
74. 87 Fla. 147, 99 So. 546 (1924).
75. 84 Fla. 223, 93 So. 687 (1922).
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essence, the vendor must give the vendee a reasonable time to perform after notice of rescission of the contract.
It is an anomaly for the Florida Supreme Court to hold the
executory land contract in such high esteem on the one hand, and
on the other hand, to classify it merely as an equitable intherest that
does not cut off prior, unrecorded legal or equitable interests. The
executory land contract results in a relationship between the vendor
and vendee that is not easily dissolved and that, in some aspects,
resembles a trustee-beneficiary relationship. Certainly the executory
land contract deserves more respect than that afforded it by the Myers
and Baumnan decisions.
CONCLUSION

The protection of equitable interests in the United States is a
confused area of the law governed by numerous and varying rules.
Many courts and authorities have been guilty of overly broad language that has only added to the confusion. Statements to the effect
that a purchaser of an equitable title is not a bona fide purchaser
and will not be protected under the recording acts do not stand up
when the courts begin to deal with the varying factual situations
presented.
Because of the need for clarification in this area, three factual
categories are separately discussed in the conclusion: the "solely"
equitable grantor cases; those cases with conflicting legal and equitable titles; and those with two conflicting equitable titles.
The "Solely" Equitable Grantee Cases
In the situation of a "solely" equitable grantee who is seeking
to enforce a right against the legal owner, the decisions are eminently
sound. A grantee who purchases an interest, knowing that such interest will have to be enforced against a third party, should be put on
notice of any inequities that existed between his equitable grantor
and the legal owner. A "solely" equitable grantee deserves no more
rights than his "solely" equitable grantor.
Conflicting Legal and Equitable Titles
A purchaser of an equitable interest from one who appears to be
the legal owner, however, presents an entirely different matter. There
is nothing in this situation to put the equitable grantee on notice.
At the very least, he should be protected up to the amount of money
that he has expended on his equitable interest. As indicated earlier,
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most courts would probably give the equitable grantee a lien on the
property in this situation. The Buck court, by fully protecting the
grantee under an executory land contract, has certainly expanded the
protection given an equitable grantee against a prior legal grantee.
If the Florida rule requires a legal purchaser to pay the full
consideration before protecting his legal interest under the recording
statute, then the Buck holding is wrong. However, there are no
Florida decisions indicating how much of the purchase price a legal
owner must pay before he is a purchaser for value under section
695.01. Should the Florida Supreme Court overturn the Buck rationale, then certainly the subsequent equitable grantee should be protected up to the amount of money he has paid on the contract of purchase. It would seem that the prior legal grantee would, at the very
least, have to protect the subsequent equitable grantee's purchase
money. The prior legal grantee who seeks the equitable remedy of
cancellation of the subsequent equitable grantee's executory contract,
should be required to do equity, that is, he should be required to reimburse a subsequent equitable grantee who relied on the record. The
rule that an equitable grantee is not a bona fide purchaser under the
recording acts should not be applied blindly so as to allow a prior
legal grantee, who failed to record, to evade accountability to the
innocent equitable grantee.
It also would appear that the purposes of the recording acts would
be more fully met if the subsequent equitable grantee's title were
protected instead of his purchase money. Certainly a person living
on land under an installment sales contract, who perhaps has built
a home on such property, will not be satisfied with a mere return
of his installment payments. Therefore, the Buck rationale appears
to make a great deal of sense. If the subsequent equitable grantee
has paid a valuable consideration, then he should be allowed to
retain the property.
It is also quite easy to imagine the situation of a prior legal
grantee who has paid only one-fourth of the purchase price and a
subsequent equitable grantee who has paid one-half or three-fourths.
On what good basis could anyone say that the prior legal grantee
who has failed to record should prevail over the subsequent equitable
grantee? Certainly the benefits of the recording acts should not inure
to those who fail to take advantage of them.
Two Conflicting Equitable Titles
Between two equitable grantees, it seems that the subsequent
grantee should prevail whether their grantor had only an equitable
interest or the legal interest. In this situation, the conflicting interests
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are only equitable. Therefore, the priority usually given a legal
interest has no bearing on the conflict.
The prior equitable grantee having failed to record, there is no
reason why he should not be estopped to assert a priority over the
subsequent equitable interest. The Florida Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of estoppel numerous times in the past to a prior
76
purchaser who failed to record.
Should the Florida Supreme Court adopt the Buck rationale,
then certainly the subsequent equitable grantee's title will defeat the
prior equitable grantee's tide. This reasoning is based on the fact
that the Buck court allowed a subsequent equitable grantee's title
to defeat a prior legal grantee's title.
If the Florida Supreme Court does not adopt the Buck decision,
then there is still no valid reason why a subsequent equitable grantee's
title should not defeat a prior equitable grantee's title. The court
may not desire to protect a subsequent equitable grantee's title
against a prior legal grantee's title. Such a position should not prevent the court from protecting a subsequent equitable grantee's title
against a prior equitable grantee.

76. Van Eepoel Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Milk Co., 100 Fla. 438, 129 So.
892 (1930); Hunter v. State Bank, 65 Fla. 202, 61 So. 497 (1913).
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